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The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 was to have a profound and long-lasting effect on U.S. Middle East 
policy.  The accession to power of Lyndon 
Baines Johnson put into the White House 
a man who regarded himself as Israel’s 
best presidential friend since Truman and 
proceeded to demonstrate the point by 
transforming the relationship between the 
United States and Israel. During the John-
son presidency, the opportunity arose to use 
the supply of tanks and planes as leverage 
to compel Israel to sign the forthcoming 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)1 
and place all its nuclear installations under 
international safeguards, in line with U.S. 
nonproliferation policy. Initially, John-
son sought to write conditions into arms 
contracts that would require Israel to forgo 
the development of nuclear weapons. Over 
the years, however, not one of the condi-
tions the United States regarded as vital to 
its own national security was met. On the 
most reliable evidence, Israel already had 
nuclear weapons, or had all the components 
in place for quick assembly, by the time it 
attacked Egypt and Syria on June 5, 1967.   
 The long-term implications were 
clear. The states around Israel would never 
resign themselves to living forever in the 
shadow of Israel’s nuclear “deterrent.” 
Sooner or later, one of them would most 
likely try to develop nuclear energy and 
perhaps a nuclear deterrent of its own. This 
is the point that Israel claims Iran is now 
close to reaching. 
 Even in the shah’s time, the U.S. 
administration was concerned with nuclear 
development in Iran. Iranian objections 
to American interference were strikingly 
similar in spirit to those expressed by the 
current Iranian government, i.e., that Iran 
would not accept “discriminatory treat-
ment” or treatment as a “second class 
citizen.”2  In the shah’s view, “You are 
asking us for safeguards that are incom-
patible with sovereignty, things that the 
French or Germans would never dream of 
doing …. Such safeguards are absolutely 
unnecessary, because Iran is a signatory 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”3   The 
government of the Islamic republic says 
it has no intention of developing nuclear 
weapons.  Both the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC), the peak body 
for all U.S. intelligence agencies, concur 
that there is no evidence of Iran’s moving 
towards weapons development and pro-
duction. Dr. Muhammad ElBaradei, the 
recently retired head of the IAEA, reported 
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in June 2008 that the agency, despite some 
problems with transparency, “has been 
able to verify the non-diversion of declared 
nuclear material in Iran.”.4 Even if Iran 
did want to produce a nuclear weapon, the 
NIC found in 2007, “We judge with high 
confidence that Iran will not be technically 
capable of producing and reprocessing 
enough plutonium for a weapon before 
about 2015.”5  In the Iranian view, the 
U.S. demand that it abandon its uranium 
enrichment program or place it under the 
control of other states6 amounts to a form 
of neo-imperialism designed to preserve 
Israel’s position as the only nuclear state in 
the region and keep the Middle East under 
Western control. 
CONDITIONS     
 Israel’s nuclear-development program 
dates back virtually to the moment of its 
creation out of Palestine. Israeli scientists 
believed that the Naqab (Negev) might 
be a source of uranium, and indeed small 
amounts were found and extracted from 
phosphate deposits. In 1955, Israel signed 
a nuclear-cooperation agreement with 
the United States under President Eisen-
hower’s Atoms for Peace program and in 
1957 began the construction of a small 
“experimental” nuclear reactor at Nahal 
Soreq. In October 1957, France agreed to 
supply Israel with a 24-megawatt reactor at 
what was to become known as the Dimona 
nuclear plant. By 1964, the reactor had 
gone critical.  In public statements, high Is-
raeli government representatives variously 
described what was taking shape in the Ne-
gev as a textile plant, an arid-land research 
plant or a metallurgical research plant.
When it was no longer possible to deny the 
nuclear nature of the plant, Israel insisted 
that it was developing nuclear energy only 
for peaceful purposes. 
 At the same time, as it was embarking 
on the road to nuclear-weapons develop-
ment, Israel was hoping to acquire tanks 
and planes from the United States.  In the 
Kennedy years, it had been supplied with 
a consignment of Hawk surface-to-air 
“defensive” missiles, but the refusal of the 
United States to become a direct supplier 
in the Middle East “arms race” had forced 
it to look elsewhere. Its main suppliers 
were France and Britain, the former pro-
viding warplanes (Super Mystère, Vautour 
and Mirage fighters) and the latter tanks 
(Centurions).  A surreptitious program in 
1964 to provide Israel with refurbished 
American M48-A1 Patton tanks through 
Germany and Italy collapsed after being 
exposed in the media.   
 The Johnson administration then took 
the historical decision to become a direct 
and open supplier of weapons to Israel. 
The president himself penned a memo 
attaching four conditions to the supply of 
tanks, insisting that they must be consid-
ered a package “and accepted as such.”7 
Three of these conditions required Israel 
to support the supply of arms to Jordan, to 
keep secret all matters under discussion, 
and to reiterate its commitment to not build 
nuclear weapons. In the fourth, Johnson 
wrote that the United States “cannot accept 
Israeli preemptive action against the Arab 
[water] diversion works but must instead 
have Israeli agreement to take this prob-
lem to the United Nations.” Johnson also 
expressed U.S. opposition to “preemptive” 
strikes against Jordan, a country that had 
neither the military means nor the intention 
to launch any action that would warrant a 
“preemptive strike.”8
 On this basis, the White House ap-
proved the direct supply of Patton tanks 
to Israel in February 1965. Johnson had 
seemed to go along with the State De-
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interests (as determined by Israel) do not at 
all times and in all respects coincide with 
those of the United States.”10 
 Having secured tanks, Israel then be-
gan campaigning for the supply of aircraft. 
Senior administration figures were hesi-
tant, if not openly opposed. U.S. policy, 
wrote one advisor, had been “a major fac-
tor in keeping us out of the Near East arms 
race and protecting the United States from 
the political damage that would result from 
a policy of uncontrolled military sales.”11 
In March 1966, however, the United States 
agreed to sell Israel 24 Skyhawk  A4e “in-
truder  type”  aircraft, with the  option left 
open for it to buy 24 more at a later date. 
During the plane negotiations, the State 
Department tried to write a clause into the 
sales agreement placing restrictions on 
Israeli nuclear development. However, it 
succeeded only in extracting what was to 
become the standard response from Israel, 
that it would not be the first country to 
introduce nuclear weapons “into the Arab-
Israeli area.”12 
 What was going on at Dimona re-
mained a matter for speculation. By 
early March 1965, Rodger P. Davies,  the 
director of  the State Department’s Of-
fice of Near Eastern Affairs, reported the 
conclusion of the embassy staff in Tel 
Aviv: Israeli scientists were  preparing 
“all necessary elements for production 
of a nuclear device, leaving undone only 
last-minute assembly.”13 The “target date” 
for the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
was 1968-69.14 In talking points given to 
Johnson ahead of the visit to Washington 
by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol 
(January 7-8, 1968), it was noted under 
the header, “what we want”: “We think 
we have an acceptable NPT. We believe 
this will serve Israel’s long-term security. 
We expect Israel to sign.”15 Yet, Eshkol 
partment view that, in return for U.S. 
tanks, Israel should be prepared to accept 
international supervision of its nuclear 
program. But eventually he backed off. 
“Given the strengthening of Israeli secu-
rity by the actions we contemplate [i.e.,the 
supply of tanks], we wish a firm reitera-
tion of  Israel’s intentions not to develop 
nuclear weapons and that Israel certify 
this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all 
of its nuclear facilities,” he wrote. How-
ever, “so long as we receive the pledge, 
… I do not insist on acceptance of IAEA 
controls now.”9  
 Johnson’s refusal to put pressure on 
Israel clearly lay in his perceptions of 
the power of the “Jewish lobby” to sup-
port him or damage him (as well as in his 
disappointed hope that, in return for his 
support of Israel, American Jews would 
support his policies on Vietnam). A wily, 
calculating politician, he had been a strong 
“supporter” of Israel since the 1940s.  
His circle of friends included Arthur and 
Mathilde Krim, Supreme Court Justice 
Abe Fortas and Abe Feinberg, all of them 
powerful figures within the lobby. Key po-
sitions in the administration and the White 
House were filled by ardent supporters of 
Israel (both Jewish and non-Jewish), with 
Johnson also maintaining an extremely 
close personal relationship with a senior 
diplomat at the Israeli embassy, Ephraim 
Evron. Johnson was given to ruminations 
on the parallels between the settlers of 
the Old West and the Zionist settlers of 
Palestine, but domestic self-interest, and 
not emotion, was the decisive element in 
the relationship he forged with Israel. Even 
among his own senior officials, the close 
relationship with Israel was not universally 
regarded as being in the best interests of 
the United States. As the American ambas-
sador to Cairo remarked in 1964, “Israel’s 
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warhead “is not the principal consider-
ation,” Hart wrote. Accordingly, the com-
ing negotiations over the supply of fighter 
aircraft represented “our last best chance” 
to prevent Israel from developing nuclear 
weapons. “We believe we are dealing with 
a matter that not only has a crucial bear-
ing on the Arab-Israeli problem but also 
directly affects U.S. security interests.  If 
Israel builds a bomb, it will be the first 
small state to do so, and that fact will have 
a profound effect on our efforts to keep the 
other near-nuclears from going over the 
threshold.”19 Less than a week later, how-
ever, Johnson assured Israeli Foreign Min-
ister Abba Eban that he would not make 
adherence to the NPT a formal condition 
of sale.20 He also told Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk that he remained “strongly op-
posed to twisting arms on the nuclear thing 
in connection with Phantoms.”21 
 In a meeting with Israeli ambassador 
Yitzhak Rabin in early November, Un-
der Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke 
repeated the assurances the United States 
was seeking, without getting any satisfac-
tion from him.22 Almost certainly, Rabin 
knew he had the president behind him. Just 
the day before his meeting with Warnke, 
Johnson had invited Rusk, Clark Clifford, 
Walt Rostow, CIA director Richard Helms 
and Generals Maxwell Taylor and Earle 
Wheeler to a working lunch at the White 
House. When Clifford and Rusk argued 
strongly that conditions be attached to the 
sale of Phantoms, Johnson told them “he 
had promised the F-4s without any condi-
tions and that was his position.”23 When 
Rabin and his team walked into Warnke’s 
office the following day, “It was abun-
dantly clear that they had been told of the 
President’s position and of his instructions 
to the Secretaries of Defense and State.”24 
The discussion that followed between 
visited Washington as planned and died 
on February 26, 1969, without having to 
budge from the formula that Israel would 
not be the first state to “introduce” nuclear 
weapons into the region. 
 LAST BEST CHANCE
 In fall 1968, with Johnson having an-
nounced on March 31 that he would not 
seek re-election, the pending supply of F-4 
Phantom fighter aircraft to Israel became 
a campaign issue. On October 14, Harold 
Saunders reiterated the State Department 
view that a decision to supply them should 
be linked to Israeli commitments to sign the 
NPT, to go no further in the development 
of surface-to-air missiles and to reaffirm 
assurances that Israel would not be the first 
state to introduce nuclear weapons into the 
region.16 Parker T. Hart, of State’s Near 
Eastern Affairs (NEA) bureau, believed 
that, because the supply of Phantoms would 
end the long-standing U.S. policy of not 
being the principal supplier of Israel’s 
weapons needs, the United States was 
entitled to seek something in return.17 The 
obvious pressure point was Israel’s nuclear 
and missile policy.  Evidence pointing to 
Israeli development of nuclear weapons 
was already on the table, with the latest 
intelligence indicating that Tel Aviv was 
also “moving rapidly towards obtaining 
and deploying strategic missiles.” Israel 
was reported to have received from France 
two MD-620 missiles (capable of reaching 
Cairo), five more were expected to arrive by 
mid-1969, and the “covert construction” of 
missile-launching and production facilities 
had been uncovered. In addition, “there is a 
report that Israel intends to provide nuclear 
warheads for the MD-620 missiles.”18
 There could be no point in Israel’s 
spending so much on missile research if 
the option of fitting missiles with a nuclear 
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and slurs  (“cheap kike”), suspicion of 
Jewish influence within the bureaucracy 
(his reference to a “Jewish cabal” in the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics), accusations 
that American Jews put Jewish interests 
first, and the standard view that the media 
was in the grip of a Jewish “stranglehold” 
provide plenty of ammunition for these 
accusations.27 Yet, many of Nixon’s senior 
advisers were Jewish, and his support for 
Israel was solid. Golda Meir regarded him 
as “my President.”  In Henry Kissinger’s 
view, “in every crisis Nixon stood by Israel 
more firmly than almost any other Presi-
dent save Harry Truman.”28 One measure 
of his support was foreign aid for Israel, 
which reached a high of $126.8 million 
(1966) during the Johnson presidency, then 
soared to $2.6 billion (1974) during the 
Nixon years, amounting to an exponen-
tial rise over the annual aid allocation to 
Israel in 1971 of $634.3 million, in 1972 
of $430.9 million, and in 1973 of $492.8 
million.29 If Lyndon Johnson gave Israel a 
green light to start one war (the Six-Day 
War) by supporting its attack on Egypt and 
Syria in 1967, Richard Nixon saved it from 
possible defeat in another (the 1973 attack 
by Egypt and Syria on Israeli positions in 
the occupied Sinai and the occupied Golan 
Heights) by authorizing a massive airlift of 
military supplies, some directly to Israeli 
military positions in Sinai. None of these 
positions were necessarily contradictory or 
mutually exclusive. Kissinger believed that 
the president’s prejudices were typical (and 
one might say reflexive) of the “uprooted 
California middle class from which he 
came.”30 These personal prejudices were 
not reflected in his political relationships 
and foreign policy. Although he believed 
that Israel’s occupation of Arab lands was 
stimulating radicalism, Syria, Egypt and 
Iraq all had close military, economic and 
Warnke and Rabin remains interesting to 
read, but with Johnson blocking any pres-
sure, the Israeli ambassador knew he did 
not have to budge.25  
 On November 27, Warnke confirmed 
the agreement of the United States to sell 
Israel 50 F-4 Phantoms and related equip-
ment and services, noting that he had made 
it clear that the United States would regard 
the “physical possession and control of nu-
clear arms by a Middle Eastern power” as 
constituting the “introduction” of nuclear 
weapons, thereby creating circumstances 
entitling the United States to cancel arms-
supply contracts. There was no mention of 
Israel’s adherence to the NPT in the pres-
ent or the future.26 
NO PRESSURE
 The end of the Johnson presidency 
ushered into the White House a man who 
would become an even better friend of 
Israel. Richard Nixon’s world was ruthless, 
expedient and utterly pragmatic. His real 
achievements in domestic and foreign pol-
icy, especially detente with China and the 
USSR, were overshadowed by the decep-
tion and lies that characterised his presi-
dency. The leaking of the Pentagon Papers 
in 1971 showed that he had authorized the 
secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos. 
The Watergate scandal of the following 
year exposed the attempt by his Committee 
to Reelect the President (CREEP) to break 
into the Democratic Party’s national head-
quarters for the purpose of planting bug-
ging devices. Impeachment proceedings 
had already been initiated against Nixon 
when he resigned on August 9, 1974.  
Nixon’s Middle East policies were shaped 
within the greater global framework of 
U.S. rivalry with the Soviet Union. His 
alleged anti-semitism has long since been 
a matter of debate. Off-the-record jokes 
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confrontation between the United States 
and the USSR. For Owens, only if Israel 
believed the U.S. government was pre-
pared to take the issue into the political 
arena “will it consider the threat of U.S. 
displeasure credible.”33
 On March 17, Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird outlined the dangers of 
nuclear development to U.S. interests in 
the Middle East.34  Critical phrases remain 
blacked out in the declassified document, 
but as Israel was the only state in the 
region believed to be developing nuclear 
weapons, along with the missiles capable 
of carrying them, it is not difficult to con-
nect the dots and identify who and what 
the secretary was talking about. In June 
and October 1968, export licenses had 
been granted for the supply of two CDC 
6400 computers and one IBM 360/65 
computer, regarded as critical tools in a 
(blacked out) country’s nuclear or nuclear-
weapons research and development. One 
CDC 6400 computer had already been 
shipped, and the secretary recommended 
that the other be withheld until “we have 
had the opportunity to discuss this whole 
problem area.”35
 For Joseph J. Sisco, half measures, 
“such as attempting to use Israeli requests 
for conventional weapons as leverage on 
this issue,” would be futile.36 The admin-
istration’s capacity to head off nuclear de-
velopment, he wrote, “basically hangs on 
the extent to which we are willing to make 
this a crunch issue with Israel.”  Echoing 
the advice already given by Henry Owen, 
the United States would have to show that 
“we are prepared to have the issue become 
public and to defend our position in the 
face of domestic pressure.”  
 On April 11, in National Security 
Study Memorandum (NSSM) 40, Nixon 
took up the specific question of Israeli nu-
political ties with the USSR. Israel’s re-
lationships lay with the United States and 
the West, in general. In the context of the 
Cold War, Nixon would do what he could 
to ensure that Israel maintained a military 
edge over the Arab states and their Soviet 
backer. Israel’s nuclear program added a 
new dimension to both the conflict be-
tween the Arabs and Israel and between the 
United States and the USSR.31
 Although there are indications that 
Johnson knew Israel had produced a 
nuclear weapon by early 1968 at the latest, 
attempts to compel Israel to abandon its nu-
clear weapons program and sign on to the 
NPT continued into the Nixon presidency. 
The new president’s position on nonprolif-
eration was set out in National Security De-
cision Memorandum (NSDM) 6 issued on 
February 5, 1969. He had decided to move 
ahead with U.S. ratification of the NPT, 
but “there should be no efforts to pressure 
other nations, in particular the Federal 
Republic of Germany, to follow suit. The 
government in its public posture should re-
flect a tone of optimism that other countries 
will sign or ratify while clearly dissociating 
itself from any plan to bring pressure on 
these countries to sign or ratify.”32  
 As the only small country suspected 
of developing nuclear weapons, Israel was 
the subject of a memorandum written on 
February 7 by Henry Owen, chairman of 
the State Department’s Policy Planning 
Council. Owen outlined the dangers of an 
Israeli nuclear-weapons capability: other 
countries would be more likely to develop 
nuclear weapons and less likely to sign 
the NPT, while Arab frustrations would 
increase, and U.S. influence in the region 
would suffer a major setback. Furthermore, 
the introduction of nuclear weapons would 
also increase the risk of war between Israel 
and the Arab states and perhaps a nuclear 
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a demolition of the systems or merely hid-
den storage and whether we should insist 
on inspection rights.”39   
 The consensus view eventually 
reached was that Israel should be asked 
for a commitment that it would not de-
velop a nuclear weapon, forcing it to hide 
its program and 
limiting any 
aspect of collu-
sion. This implied 
an acceptance of 
Israel’s definition 
of “develop,” 
which was that 
a nuclear bomb 
could not be said 
to have been “introduced” or “developed” 
until tested and fully assembled. In other 
words, as long as all the parts of a nuclear 
weapon were not fully assembled, it could 
not be said to have been developed. What 
was being advocated was a policy of 
tacit acceptance of what the United States 
suspected and almost certainly knew. Israel 
could not be stripped of weapons it had 
already produced, but as long as it agreed 
not to develop weapons and agreed to keep 
research and development under wraps, 
the United States would be able to feign 
ignorance of the reality.   
 The same argument was used with 
regard to missiles acquisition and deploy-
ment. By this time, it was believed that 
Israel already had 11 or 12 nuclear-capable 
surface-to-surface M-620 Jericho mis-
siles (developed and tested in France) and 
would have 25 to 30 by the end of 1970, 
10 of them programmed for nuclear war-
heads. Once these missiles were deployed, 
“the whole world would be convinced that 
Israel had nuclear warheads.”40  Accord-
ingly, Israel’s agreement “not to deploy 
missiles it produced but to keep them hid-
clear-weapons development, requesting a 
review of all possible options. The request 
was followed through by the formation of 
a committee consisting of Dr. Kissinger 
(the chairman) and representatives of the 
CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior 
figures from the Departments of State and 
Defense. By now, 
it was widely 
assumed within 
the administra-
tion that Israel 
had already suc-
ceeded in devel-
oping a nuclear 
weapon, changing 
the focal point of 
discussion from prevention to accommoda-
tion and the safeguards the United States 
still wanted Israel to accept.  
 On June 26, the issues were reviewed 
at a meeting headed by Kissinger’s com-
mittee.37 It was noted that, while there was 
substantial agreement between government 
agencies on what the United States wanted 
from Israel, “there were significant differ-
ences as to the degree of pressure we were 
ready to apply [and] whether the threat of 
pressures should be implicit or explicit.”38 
Rather than seeking a commitment from 
Israel not to produce nuclear weapons, 
Kissinger believed the United States 
should now seek “private, bilateral assur-
ances that Israel would not deploy or test 
nuclear explosive devices.” Furthermore, 
“we should seek to create circumstances 
in which Israel would not ‘announce’ a 
nuclear capability and would maintain se-
crecy on its research and development ac-
tivity.” In Kissinger’s opinion, the United 
States should avoid a direct confrontation 
with Israel, “as well as public knowledge 
of Israeli nuclear activities. We should also 
determine whether we are going to ask for 
Kissinger stressed the need to 
disinguish between Israel’s secret 
possession of nuclear weapons and 
public knowledge of their existence, 
which he regarded as “almost as 
dangerous as possession itself ….” 
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to launching pads. What non-deployment 
means is that Israel could produce the mis-
siles and  then put them in a shed instead of 
in the launching area.”43 Kissinger stressed 
the need to disinguish between Israel’s 
secret possession of nuclear weapons and 
public knowledge of their existence, which 
he regarded as “almost as dangerous as 
possession itself .… What this means is 
that while we might ideally like to halt ac-
tual Israeli possession, what we really want 
at a minimum may be just to keep Israeli 
possession from becoming an established 
international fact.”44
 On July 28, Sisco set out talking points 
for upcoming discussions with Yitzhak 
Rabin, who was still the Israeli ambas-
sador.45 Israeli and U.S. negotiators met 
the following day. Present on the U.S. 
side were Acting Secretary of State Elliot 
Richardson, Under Secretary of Defense 
David Packard and Alfred L. Atherton, the 
country director on Arab-Israeli affairs.46 
Representing the Israelis were Rabin, em-
bassy minister Shlomo Argov (the target in 
1982 of an assassination attempt in Lon-
don that was used by Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Menachem Begin as a pretext to attack 
Lebanon), and embassy counsellor Moshe 
Raviv. Richardson began by reading a 
statement of concern over the prospective 
introduction of nuclear weapons and deliv-
ery systems into the Middle East, warning 
that the United States would regard this “as 
a direct threat to United States national se-
curity.” Washington attached great weight 
to assurances given by Israel, but with the 
NPT now in existence, he added, “unilat-
eral assurances are no longer sufficient in 
themselves to give the world confidence 
that Israel does not intend to manufacture 
nuclear weapons.”  
 Israel was not just another state that 
was stalling on the question of adhering to 
den might be easier to maintain and [would 
not] be completely inconsistent with U.S. 
interests.” Although the United States was 
now watering down its objectives, using 
the supply of F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft 
as a bargaining counter did not seem likely 
in view of Nixon’s attitude: “K [Kissinger] 
said he had talked with Pres[ident] this 
morning and he is very leery of cutting off 
phantoms [sic].”41 
 Early in July, the “issues for decision” 
were reviewed.42 The recommendations to 
be sent to the president included continued 
pressure on Israel to sign the NPT before 
the end of the year alongside “our unstated 
objective to keep Israel’s nuclear weapons 
from becoming public knowledge” and 
“our stated purpose for internal working 
purposes to stop Israel from assembling 
completed nuclear devices.” Israel would 
also be asked to reaffirm that it would not 
be the first country to introduce nuclear 
weapons into the Middle East, with intro-
duction specified to mean the “possession 
of nuclear explosive devices.” On the 
tactics to be adopted in getting assurances 
from Israel, “the issue is whether we are 
prepared to imply — and to carry out if 
necessary — the threat not to deliver the 
Phantoms if Israel does not comply with 
our request” [emphasis in original]. 
 With Nixon having already made it 
plain that he would support this kind of 
pressure, a “gentle approach” minimizing 
“the atmosphere of confrontation” was 
ultimately adopted.  On the question of 
nuclear-capable missiles, it was suggested 
that Israel be asked not to deploy the mis-
siles and halt their production, “but that we 
be prepared to settle for their agreement 
not to deploy.” As with nuclear weapons, 
“the significant act is general public aware-
ness of the weapon, and this would surely 
follow from deployment of these missiles 
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hurrying past points at which they in-
dicated a desire for a closer look.  The 
fact that the team avoided creating 
issues can give rise to the semantic 
interpretation that what went on satis-
fied them, which is in essence what 
the Israelis replied to the Embassy. 
 The AEC team went on to caution that 
the visits could even be regarded as coun-
terproductive because they could be used 
in the future as evidence of “cooperation” 
and “U.S. satisfaction”49 
 On September 8, Richard Helms sent a 
message to Richard Nixon in an envelope 
marked “For and to be opened only by: The 
President.”50  The contents have never been 
disclosed, and indeed are not to be found 
in the archives, but almost certainly the 
subject was Israeli nuclear-weapons devel-
opment.51  Mrs. Meir was due to arrive later 
in the month. In the weeks beforehand, the 
U.S. position was reaffirmed in two impor-
tant documents, one a Memorandum for the 
President by Secretary of State William P. 
Rogers on the “suggested position” to take 
with the Israeli prime minister,52 and the 
second a background paper written for Dr. 
Kissinger. Rogers regarded the Meir visit 
as offering an opportunity
to get across clearly to her why we 
believe Israel’s stand-pat policy is 
detrimental to both U.S. and Israeli 
interests and no longer tenable in the 
situation we now face, both in the area 
and the diplomatic field.  In doing so 
we should, I believe, seek to prepare 
the Israelis for moves on our part 
designed to counter the growing im-
pression in the world that we support 
territorial expansion as a legitimate 
Israeli peace aim.
 At the same time, Rogers advised, Is-
rael should be reassured on the U.S. com-
the NPT. It had the technical capacity to 
build nuclear weapons, and the world was 
also becoming aware that it was acquir-
ing missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads. Because it was so close to the 
nuclear-weapons threshold, Richardson 
asserted,“Israel’s attitude toward the NPT 
is being closely watched by other small and 
medium-sized states who are waiting to see 
whether nuclear-weapons non-proliferation 
can be made to prevail as a global princi-
ple. We therefore attach utmost importance 
to Israel’s early signature and ratification 
of the NPT.” Richardson also made it 
clear that the United States regarded the 
actual possession of nuclear weapons as 
equivalent to introducing them, irrespective 
of whether they were untested and unad-
vertised. On all of these questions, Rabin 
stalled, and talks ended without his giving 
any of the assurances being sought.  
 The United States was still trying to 
find out what was happening at Dimona 
through the visits of scientists. A team 
visited in early July, but it had not been 
able to make a full examination.47 Review-
ing the history of these visits,   Robert H. 
Munn of Near Eastern Affairs reported 
that Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
officials had drawn the inference that the 
U.S. government was not prepared to 
support real inspections. In many subtle 
ways the team had been cautioned to avoid 
controversy and not take issue with the 
obvious will of the hosts.48 In the absence 
of a “positive mandate” to inspect, “with 
all that word implied,” the AEC team  
did not make an issue of the fact 
that the program drawn up by Israel 
shifted timing and focus in important 
ways, which limited their access to 
key facilities.  Nor did they take issue 
with their host’s obvious pushing and 
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lieve, is an Israeli commitment that will 
prevent nuclear weapons from becoming a 
known factor and further complicating the 
Arab-Israeli situation.”61  On November 
6, he recommended “that we not press the 
Israelis any further on this subject at this 
time.”62 By this time, elections had been 
held in Israel and Mrs. Meir had formed a 
national unity government. On February 
23, 1970, Rabin asked Kissinger to pass 
on the message to Nixon “that Israel has 
no intention to sign the NPT. The reply 
to the State Department had been along 
strictly formal lines, but the Prime Minister 
wanted to make sure there was no misap-
prehension about Israel’s current inten-
tion.” Furthermore, Israel would regard 
any attempt to link arms sales to the NPT 
as “extremely unfortunate.”63 
 The official position of the U.S. 
administration from now on would be, 
“While in our judgment Israel has the tech-
nical and scientific capability to produce 
nuclear weapons, we have no concrete evi-
dence that it has done so.”64  At the highest 
level of government, a tacit understanding 
had been reached. Israel would insist that it 
would not be the first country to introduce 
nuclear weapons into the Middle East, 
but as long as it did not test weapons,  the 
United States could pretend that it did not 
really know whether it had them or not. 
Israel’s policy of “opacity” on the question 
of nuclear weapons was now the policy of 
the United States as well.  
 Israel had held its ground during years 
of negotiations and got everything it want-
ed without giving anything of substance in 
return. The role of the White House in pre-
venting the kind of pressure being put on 
Israel that might have curtailed its nuclear-
weapon and missile-development programs 
was central. In no part of the world did the 
United States seem more determined to 
mitment to its security, although there was 
no need to give Mrs. Meir a firm answer 
before the end of the year.53  
 In the background paper written for 
Dr. Kissinger,54  it was noted that, while 
Israel “resents our position,” it may have 
concluded that “since we have not gone 
beyond words in pressing our point, we are 
actually resigned to seeing Israel become 
a nuclear power.”  Israel seemed to have 
applied the axiom, “Never mind what they 
say, it’s what they do that counts.”55 In this 
respect, the United States had increased 
the level of arms sales to Israel “virtu-
ally without condition.” In conclusion, “It 
seems clear that only substantial pressure 
in an area sensitive to Israel could change 
Israel’s determination to avoid meaningful 
discussion of the nuclear problem.” 
 On September 26, Nixon met Meir 
in the Oval Office. What they discussed 
in private remains mostly out of sight.56  
Kissinger was briefed but “apparently re-
mained only partially informed” about the 
nature of the talks.57 There is an indication 
of the substance, however, in his obser-
vation to the president that “during your 
private discussions with Golda Meir you 
emphasized that our primary concern was 
that Israel make no visible introduction of 
nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear 
test program.”58 This account suggests, 
moreover, that possibly Mrs. Meir ac-
knowledged, “tacitly or explicitly,” that59 
Israel had the bombs “and may have as-
sured Nixon that Israel thought of nuclear 
weapons as a last-resort option.”60
 The central issue was not the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons or their pos-
session.  Most probably Nixon and Meir 
agreed that, if Israel did not draw attention 
to its nuclear activities, the United States 
would look the other way. In Kissinger’s 
view, “What we have to settle for, I be-
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 The beginning of the nuclear age in 
the Middle East was to have consequences 
that are being felt to the present day. No 
one outside the highest echelons of the 
Israeli government knows how many 
nuclear weapons Israel has produced and 
stockpiled. Outside estimates range from 
between 60-80 to about 400, with the 
Federation of American Scientists believ-
ing the true figure to be probably less than 
100.66 No one really knows.  Iran, which 
has signed on to the NPT and allows IAEA 
inspections of  (not “visits” to)  its nuclear 
sites, has not produced one, yet is being 
threatened with military attack. 
prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
than the Middle East. Its positions were 
expressed forcefully year after year, yet it 
ultimately backed down from every posi-
tion it had held. It was unable to prevent 
Israel from developing nuclear weapons 
or deploying the missiles that could carry 
them to any part of the Arab world. It failed 
to persuade Israel to sign on to the NPT. Its 
provision of supercomputers enabled Israel 
to simulate nuclear tests, while the mys-
terious flash off the coast of South Africa 
on September 22, 1979, is widely thought 
to have been the physical test of a nuclear 
weapon jointly arranged by Israel and the 
South African government.65
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